I’m a philosopher conducting research in the epistemology and methodology of science (especially economics), the metaphysics and ethics of science, political economy, and history of philosophy.

One of the main goals of my research is a better understanding of how scientists can conduct causal inference (for purposes of explanation, prediction or control) if the underlying system is complex: if they investigate the climate, a pandemic, the economy, a beehive, or the world wide web. Causal inference is difficult, if not impossible, if the respective system is extremely sensitive to initial conditions, if its components are extremely heterogeneous, or if it includes relations of downward causation between upper and lower level variables. A disturbing problem is that policy interventions (like an interest rate cut) cannot be justified to the general public or public institutions if scientists (like macroeconomists) cannot conduct causal inference: if they cannot provide evidence in support of the causal hypotheses that policymakers cite to justify interventions (e.g. in support of the hypothesis that inflation causally depends on interest rates). An important question relates to the possibility of improving causal inference methods to such an extent that policy interventions can be justified.

Another goal of my research is a better understanding of the role that non-scientific values (ideologies, material interests, moral judgments, “in-group” preferences etc.) play in the sciences, including computer science. I have worked on prominent arguments that challenge the ideal of value-free science and have become interested in corresponding arguments that aim to establish the “inevitable” or “inescapable” bias of algorithms, especially of the decision algorithms that are widely used in the judiciary, credit lending, hiring, school admission, medical diagnosis etc. I am currently investigating whether it is possible in principle to render these algorithms unbiased (or “fair”) by making them dependent on conditions (“fairness constraints”) which express concepts of moral or political philosophy.

Further interests of mine include methodological problems of behavioral welfare economics, ethical positions that govern the economic analysis of welfare policies targeting the satisfaction of other-regarding preferences, pragmatic (or Neo-Kantian) positions about dispositions and structures (understood as relations between subatomic particles), the theoretical and practical philosophy of Kant, Marx’s theory of capital and Heidegger’s philosophy in Being and Time.

Epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics of science:

Philosophie der Wissenschaft, Komplexität und KI: eine Einführung (a textbook of about 250 pages, under contract with Springer/Metzler).

“How strong is the argument from inductive risk?”, European Journal for Philosophy of Science (2021) (https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-021-00409-x).

“Subatomic particles, epistemic stances, and Kantian antinomies”, Journal for General Philosophy of Science (2021) (https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-021-09567-1).

“Complexity features, (putative) truisms, and the Ising model” (essay review of What Is a Complex System? by James Ladyman and Karoline Wiesner. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020), Journal for General Philosophy of Science 52 (2021): 475-482.

“Ceteris paribus conditions and the interventionist account of causality”, Synthese 192 (2015/10): 3297-3311.

Economic methodology and political economy:

“Some problems of causal inference in agent-based macroeconomics”, Economics & Philosophy (2025).

Causality and objectivity in macroeconomics. London: Routledge INEM Advances in Economic Methodology, 2023.

“Causality and probability”, in C. Heilmann and J. Reiss (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics. London: Routledge (2021), chap. 20.

“Response to ‘Response to Henschen: causal pluralism in macroeconomics’”, Journal of Economic Methodology 27(2020/3): 263-265.

“The logic of scientific discovery in macroeconomics.” In M. Addis et al. (eds.), Scientific Discovery in the Social Sciences. Heidelberg: Springer (2019), 103-119.

“Book review of Econophysics and Financial Economics: An Emerging Dialogue, by Francke Jovanovic and Christophe Schinckus (Oxford: OUP)”, Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination 14 (2019): 425-430.

“What is macroeconomic causality?”, Journal of Economic Methodology 25 (2018/1): 1-20.

“The in-principle inconclusiveness of causal evidence in macroeconomics”, European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (2018): 709-733.

History of philosophy:

“Marx on alienation and employee capital participation”, European Journal for the History of Economic Thought 27(2020/2): 230-247.

“Kant’s refutation of Hume’s position on causality”. In V. L. Waibel et al. (eds.), Akten des XII. Kant-Kongresses. Berlin: de Gruyter (2018): 1485-1494.

“Kant on causal laws and powers”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 48 (2014/4), 20-29.

“Kant’s Pragmatism”, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (2013/1): 165-176.

“Dreyfus and Haugeland on Heidegger and Authenticity”, Human Studies 35 (2012/1): 95-113.

Gebrauch oder Herstellung? Heidegger über Eigentlichkeit, Wahrheit und phänomenologische Methode. Paderborn: Mentis, 2010.

„Heideggers Korrektion des göttlichen Worts“, Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 51 (2009/3): 289-308.