I’m a philosopher conducting research in the epistemology and methodology of science (especially economics), the metaphysics and ethics of science, political economy, and history of philosophy.

One of the main goals of my research is a better understanding of how macroeconomists can justify policy interventions (like interest rate cuts) to the general public or public institutions if the economy is a complex system. To justify policy interventions, macroeconomists need to provide evidence in support of causal hypotheses (claiming, for instance, that inflation causally depends on interest rates). But causal evidence can be difficult to obtain if the underlying system is complex: if it is extremely sensitive to initial conditions, or if there are relations of downward causation between macroeconomic variables (denoting, for instance, inflation) and microeconomic variables (denoting, for instance, inflation expectations). An important question relates to the possibility of improving causal inference methods to such an extent that they can deal with cases of extreme sensitivity and downward causation.

Another goal of my research is a better understanding of individual and social welfare (or well-being) and welfare policies. At least in applied work, economists often assume that individual welfare is the satisfaction of preferences that are exclusively self-regarding and measurable in monetary terms. But climate change and social fragmentation due to globalization and technological advance make it plain that preferences for climate protection (that arguably cannot be measured in monetary terms) and (other-regarding) preferences for fairness and social cohesion can be relevant to individual and social welfare. An important question is whether welfare economics (cost-benefit analysis or social choice theory) can be used to analyze the policies that target the satisfaction of these preferences, or whether an alternative theory is needed.

I defend pragmatic (or Neo-Kantian) positions with respect to dispositions and structures (understood as relations between subatomic particles). I also defend the value-free ideal: I argue against the currently widespread idea that science is necessarily value-laden even at its core, and that algorithms are necessarily biased. In the history of philosophy, I work primarily on the theoretical and practical philosophy of Kant, on Marx’s theory of capital and Heidegger’s philosophy in Being and Time.

Epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics of science:

“The two faces of ontic-structural realism” (in progress).

“Are algorithms necessarily biased? The case of causal search algorithms” (in progress).

Einführung in die Wissenschaftsphilosophie (book manuscript, about 200 pages)

“How strong is the argument from inductive risk?”, European Journal for Philosophy of Science (2021) (https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-021-00409-x).

“Subatomic particles, epistemic stances, and Kantian antinomies”, Journal for General Philosophy of Science (2021) (https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-021-09567-1).

“Complexity features, (putative) truisms, and the Ising model” (essay review of What Is a Complex System? by James Ladyman and Karoline Wiesner. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2020), Journal for General Philosophy of Science 52 (2021): 475-482.

Ceteris paribus conditions and the interventionist account of causality”, Synthese 192 (2015/10): 3297-3311.

Economic methodology and political economy:

“Individual welfare and the hierarchy of preferences” (in progress).

“Strong reciprocity and welfare non-.consequentialism” (in progress).

“Aggregation and causation in macroeconomics: toward a program of empirical microfoundations” (in progress)

“Some problems of causal inference in agent-based macroeconomics”, Economics & Philosophy (accepted, minor revisions).

Causality and objectivity in macroeconomics. London: Routledge, 2023.

“Causality and probability”, in C. Heilmann and J. Reiss (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Economics. London: Routledge (2021), chap. 20.

“Response to ‘Response to Henschen: causal pluralism in macroeconomics’”, Journal of Economic Methodology 27(2020/3): 263-265.

“The logic of scientific discovery in macroeconomics.” In M. Addis et al. (eds.), Scientific Discovery in the Social Sciences. Heidelberg: Springer (2019), 103-119.

“Book review of Econophysics and Financial Economics: An Emerging Dialogue, by Francke Jovanovic and Christophe Schinckus (Oxford: OUP)”, Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination 14 (2019): 425-430.

“What is macroeconomic causality?”, Journal of Economic Methodology 25 (2018/1): 1-20.

“The in-principle inconclusiveness of causal evidence in macroeconomics”, European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (2018): 709-733.

History of philosophy:

“Marx on alienation and employee capital participation”, European Journal for the History of Economic Thought 27(2020/2): 230-247.

“Kant’s refutation of Hume’s position on causality”. In V. L. Waibel et al. (eds.), Akten des XII. Kant-Kongresses. Berlin: de Gruyter (2018): 1485-1494.

“Kant on causal laws and powers”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 48 (2014/4), 20-29.

“Kant’s Pragmatism”, British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (2013/1): 165-176.

“Dreyfus and Haugeland on Heidegger and Authenticity”, Human Studies 35 (2012/1): 95-113.

Gebrauch oder Herstellung? Heidegger über Eigentlichkeit, Wahrheit und phänomenologische Methode. Paderborn: Mentis, 2010.

„Heideggers Korrektion des göttlichen Worts“, Neue Zeitschrift für Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 51 (2009/3): 289-308.

„Sein und Kunst. Heidegger über Kunstwerke und die angemessene Intention von Dingen“. In Hügli et al. (eds.), Existenz und Sinn. Heidelberg: Winter (2009), 187-209.

„Furcht, Angst und hüzün: Die Entformalisierung zweier ontologischer Begriffe Heideggers durch Pamuks Begriff kollektiver Wehmut“, Studia Phaenomenologica Vol. VIII (2008): 307-330.